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Jason Brennan and Bas van der Vossen
The Myths of the Self-Ownership Thesis
The idea of self-ownership lies close to the heart of libertarianism. The view
affirms that each person, no matter their background, ethnicity, gender, social or
economic status has a right to live their own life as they see fit, consistent with the same
rights for others. As self-owners, we do not need permission to take a certain job. As
self-owners, we do not need permission to move to a different place. As self-owners, we
can say no to those who want to touch us or use our bodies in ways we do not want.
Perhaps because the idea is so central, many commentators treat self-ownership
as the foundation or starting point of libertarian theories. Most famously (or
infamously), Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) is said to heavily rely on
this idea. The principle of self-ownership is supposed to move us to accept Nozick’s
libertarian outlook. For Nozick, it is said, self-ownership is the premise, libertarianism
the conclusion. (See Cohen 1995; Taylor, 2004; Mack, 2002; Vallentyne and Steiner,
2002)
Critics of Nozick, and libertarianism in general, thus take their task to be simply
the undermining of the idea of self-ownership. Consider Dave Sobel’s recent comments:
Because property rights in this tradition have been understood to create such
powerful moral side constraints on permissible action, such libertarians have
been able to offer a very simple, intuitive, principled, and not very hostage to
empirical fortune rationale for the central conclusions we associate with
libertarianism. Why may the state not forcibly take some of my money or blood
and give it to others who need it more badly than I do? Because to do so would
be to violate my morally very powerful property rights. Why may the state not
act paternalistically toward its citizens? Again, because doing so would wrongly
suppose that you rather than I may decide what will happen to things I own.
Why may the state not regulate what kind of sex I may have with consenting
competent adults or what I may smoke in ways that infringe on no one else’s
rights? Ditto. (Sobel 2012, pp. 33-4)
Similar sentiments can be found in Thomas Nagel (1975) and G.A. Cohen (1995).
We disagree. On our reading, Nozick is not best understood in this way. And,
more importantly, libertarianism as a theory is not best understood in this way. Contrary
to the critics’ popular view, self-ownership is the conclusion at which libertarian theories
aim. It’s the idea that results, or arises, once we take seriously the arguments that
libertarians, including Nozick, have to offer. In part, then, self-ownership is an attractive
moral ideal because its denial is morally very unattractive.
As a result, every reasonable or remotely plausible theory of justice will have to
recognize some role for the self-ownership thesis. And disputes between libertarians
and left-liberals are not really about whether individuals are self-owners, but rather
about which conception of self-ownership is the correct one. So, self-ownership is not a

myth. But there are a number of myths about it, including A) that’s a foundational
premise in libertarian, especially Robert Nozick’s, thought, and B) that left-liberals deny
it while libertarians accept it.
Re-Reading Nozick
Many read Nozick as making the following kind of argument, the Self-Ownership
Implies Libertarianism Argument:
1. Every moral agent is a self-owner.
2. To be a self-owner implies very weighty rights over one’s own body, as well as
(under the right circumstances) weighty rights to acquire, hold, and transfer
property at one’s will.
3. For the modern nation-state to produce (most) regulation, paternalistic laws,
public goods, and social insurance, it has to violate these rights.
4. Therefore, the modern nation-state is to that extent unjust.
We suspect Nozick, at least as of writing Anarchy, State, and Utopia, did accept
each of the premises of this argument. As a result, he would have to say the argument is
sound.
But at the same time, it seems Nozick recognizes that that the premises, especial
premise 2, is controversial. For, aside from a remark in the preface that summarizes the
puzzle he intends to engage with (Nozick 1974, p. ix , he nowhere appears to actually
make this argument. In fact, throughout the book, Nozick doesn’t make much use of the
concept of self-ownership at all. If anything, it seems like Nozick thinks of the selfownership thesis as a conclusion, not a premise.
The term “self-ownership” appears only once in Anarchy, State and Utopia, on p.
172. In that passage, Nozick says that certain conceptions of distributive justice do seem
to represent a shift from the classical liberal thought that people own themselves to a
view that people have partial ownership rights in one another. You could delete this
short paragraph from the book, and it would have no effect on the overall argument.
Anarchy, State and Utopia is divided into three parts. Part I argues that a minimal
state is compatible with the strong libertarian rights certain anarcho-capitalist
libertarians believe all people have. That is, part I tries to show that a commitment to a
very strong view of rights does not lead to anarchism. Part II argues that a more-thanminimal state is not defensible. Part III argues that a minimal state can be inspiring—
that it can lead to something we might consider a kind of utopia. (See Brennan 2014 for
a further defense of Nozick’s utopia using G. A. Cohen’s premises.)
Nozick begins Anarchy, State and Utopia as follows: “Individuals have rights, and
there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights). So
strong and far-reaching are these rights that they raise the question of what, if anything,
the state and its officials may do.” (Nozick 1974, p. ix.) In the next paragraph, Nozick
says that his main conclusions will be that a minimal state can be justified, but a morethan-minimal state cannot. A more-than-minimal state will violate people’s rights. The
state may not use coercion to get some citizens to aid others, nor may the state engage

in any paternalistic activities. These opening paragraphs are misleading—they seem to
cause most readers to misunderstand Nozick’s argument.
Part I is primarily addressed to a subset of libertarians. It starts with the the
idea—which Nozick defends only very briefly—that people have very strong rights
against coercive interference. One reason that Nozick takes this starting point is to avoid
begging the question on his own behalf. The people he wants to criticize (in particular
the anarcho-capitalist Murray Rothbard) believe that we have strong rights and that
these rights prohibit any sort of state. And Nozick wants to show that at least a minimal
state can be justified, even if people like Rothbard are correct that we have such strong
and extensive rights. Nozick’s strategy here is to argue that a minimal state could, and
indeed predictably would, arise naturally without violating anyone’s rights. While much
of what happens in Part I, such as his critique of utilitarianism, is addressed to everyone,
Part I is not an argument against the defenders of the more-than-minimal state.
If Part I is primarily meant to convince the anarcho-capitalist libertarian that the
minimal state is justifiable, Part II is addressed to everyone else who would like the state
to be more than minimal. Following Thomas Nagel (1975), many readers complain that
Anarchy, State and Utopia lacks foundations. They complain that Nozick simply
assumes—without much argument—that people have very strong and extensive rights
(including property rights) against coercive interference. Philosophers worry that this
makes his argument against the more-than-minimal state too easy. If we have a nearly
absolute right to my rightfully acquired property—a right that can presumably be
overridden only in order to prevent “catastrophic moral horror” (Nozick 1974, p.30)—
then of course we cannot be taxed to provide a social minimum or public education.
Nozick does, of course, argue that such a more extensive state cannot be
justified. But he crucially does not do this in the same way he argued in Part I. He does
not simply appeal again to the rights he’s invoked in Part I and argue that the morethan-minimal state is incompatible with them. Instead, he goes through a lengthy and
complex set of arguments to show that the most popular defenses of the more-thanminimal state are untenable. Thus, Nozick constructs lengthy internal critiques of Marx,
Rawls, and others. He also draws out what sees as the undesirable implications of the
more than minimal state, arguing that it is incompatible with the liberal ideas Rawlsians
and others espouse. If Nozick’s argument in part II were just that the minimal state is
incompatible with Rothbard’s view of rights, then part II would only need to be about 3
pages long.
The first two paragraphs of Anarchy, State and Utopia mislead critics. However,
the remainder of the book, and especially the last paragraph on p. xi, could have made
them realize their mistake. Here’s Nozick summarizing Part II again:
Part II contends that no more extensive state can be justified. I proceed by
arguing that a diversity of reasons which purport to justify a more extensive
state, don’t… [Nozick then discusses his internal critique of Rawls at great length]
… Other reasons that some might think justify a more extensive state are
criticized, including equality, envy, workers’ control, and Marxian theories of
exploitation. (Nozick 1974, p. xi)

Nozick argues against the more-than-minimal state not by showing it is incompatible
with self-ownership, but by trying to show that a wide range of arguments for the morethan-minimal state fail. He tries to point out flaws in each of these arguments, usually
by showing how these arguments clash with commonsense and widely shared moral
beliefs, or by showing that these arguments, if taken seriously, would not only show
that the state can regulate the economy, but should severely curtail civil rights as well.
For instance, in chapter 8, Nozick considers a left-liberal argument on behalf of
the claim that the government should regulate the economy and redistribute wealth in
order to produce equal opportunity. His response is to note that the appeal of such
arguments seem to rely on the metaphor of society being a race, a zero-sum game, and
that they claim winners should compensate losers. And because the metaphor is
problematic and misleading in its own right (as society is not like a race), these
arguments are not compelling. Society is a cooperative venture for mutual gain, not a
race. It is a positive-sum game, not zero-sum game. The arguments are not so much
mistaken as they are irrelevant; egalitarians are giving us theories of justice for societies
that work differently from actual commercial societies.
One reason the race metaphor is problematic is because of its implications in
related contexts. Nozick asks us to suppose that his wife married him for his keen
intelligence and good looks (Nozick 1974, p. 237-8). Suppose that he beat other suitors
who were dumber and uglier. Should he or society as a whole have to compensate
those other suitors for their loss? Should they pay for the suitors’ plastic surgery, or for
classes to improve their intelligence? Should we consider handicapping smart, goodlooking men in order to prevent them from having unfair and unearned advantages on
the dating market? Nozick expects that the left-liberals against whom he argues would
consider such suggestions evil and absurd. And so, by extension, they should abandon
their arguments for equality of opportunity in other contexts as well, unless they can
somehow identify a principled reason why these arguments apply in some cases and not
others.
Similar remarks apply to question of “having a say over what affects you” (Nozick
1974, 268-71). Nozick notes that many on the Left say that because individuals should
have “a right to a say in important decisions that affect their lives,” the state
government should have extensive control over the economy (Nozick 1974, 168). But,
Nozick notes, at least at first glance, this argument applies equally well for allowing the
state to submit personal decisions about whom to marry to democratic control. He asks
us to imagine a woman has four suitors. We would never think that these five people, or
their friends and family, should get to vote on her decision, even though they “should
have a right to say in important decisions that affect their lives”. She has the right to say
no, even if saying no devastates the suitors and their families.
Nozick uses arguments like this to point out something odd about how some
left-liberals (and others) think. They often maintain that certain arguments or reasons
justify restricting economic liberty, or, at more weakly, justify forcing those who do
better under freedom to compensate those who do worse. For instance, someone on
the Left might say, “Allowing competition on the market can hurt competitors, so we

should restrict economic freedom or require winners to compensate losers.” But, Nozick
points out, none of them would also say, “Allowing competition for friends and lovers
can hurt competitors, so we should restrict freedom of association or require winners to
compensate losers.” Or, a left-liberal might say, “Asymmetric information in auto
markets means that some people can exploit others, so the government ought to
heavily regulate auto markets.” A Nozickian response might be, “There’s even more
asymmetric information in dating markets, and the effects of bad relationships are even
more devastating than paying too much for a used car. Should the government thus
heavily regulate dating?” A left-liberal would probably say that of course it shouldn’t,
but, Nozick might say, this tells us that the asymmetric information argument isn’t doing
the real work for that left-liberal.
A Nozickian Rejoinder to Nagel and Murphy’s Myth of Ownership
One of Nozick’s main moves in Part II is to show the left typically assumes, rather
than proves, that economic liberty is of lower status and importance than civil liberty.
Leftist philosophers offer some argument for restricting personal economic liberty.
Nozick asks whether this argument isn’t also an argument for restricting the civil
liberties we all agree people ought to have? If an argument for regulating the market
applies equally well as an argument for regulating friendship, then why think it only
“works” as an argument for state control of the economy? Unless we’re offered a
principled, non-question-begging reason to distinguish the two, the argument is again to
be rejected.
We can see the force of this style of argument by considering Liam Murphy and
Thomas Nagel’s recent attack on a certain conception of property rights in The Myth of
Ownership (2002). Murphy and Nagel appear to have a quick, decisive objection to
natural rights libertarianism, as well as what they called “everyday libertarianism”
(Murphy and Nagel 2002, p. 37). But if their argument succeeds, we might say following
Nozick, that doesn’t just show libertarianism to be false, but causes trouble for their
own brand of left-liberalism as well.
Most people are so-called everyday libertarians. That is, they believe they have
at least a prima facie claim or defeasible right to their pre-tax income. Murphy and
Nagel want to argue that people have no such claims. Pre-tax income, they say, is an
accounting fiction. What is properly ours is whatever remains after taxes.
Let’s call Murphy and Nagel’s argument against libertarianism the Institutional
Dependence Argument (IDA). It goes like this. The current scheme of income and
patterns of property holdings would not exist without government and the taxes that
support it. Therefore, I cannot be said to have a natural right to my income, because my
income results from social convention. In the state of nature, I have no income to have a
natural right to.
Suppose Jason makes $300K a year pre-tax. Without the scheme of taxation that
supports government and public goods, Jason would not be making $300K a year.
Everyday libertarians talk as if the government is taking people’s income when taxes
them, but citizens would have little or no income if the government were not providing
the background institutions needed to sustain the market system.

On Murphy and Nagel’s view, government and the taxes supporting it create a
set of property holdings and an income distribution. Some of this creation comes about
directly, through subsidies and government employment, but most of it comes
indirectly, through market forces operating against the background of the governmentprovided rule of law. From this, Murphy and Nagel conclude that we cannot evaluate
the justice of taxes separately, as if taxes were an intrusion onto our rightful holdings,
but must instead evaluate the justice of the system as a whole. Murphy and Nagel claim
that a person’s level of benefit from the system can roughly be measured by the
difference between her earnings in that system versus her expected earnings in the
state of nature or in pre-civilized society (Murphy and Nagel 2002, p. 16). For a
$300K/year earner, this is nearly all of her income. They conclude that people have no
entitlement to their pre-tax income (Murphy and Nagel 2002, p. 32).
Murphy and Nagel use the IDA to block objections to taxation. However, the IDA
generalizes to block other objections to other government actions. In particular, the IDA
can be used to generate a large range of illiberal conclusions that egalitarian liberals
(such as Murphy and Nagel) would want to reject. It’s a dangerous argument for liberals
to advance.
For example, consider we might could call “everyday liberalism”. Everyday
liberalism holds that people have a special claim to their bodies and deciding what to do
with their time. Why can’t the government set up a corvée—a tax paid by labor—or
labor armies in lieu of or in addition to monetary taxes? On the reasoning of the IDA, we
do not own our pre-corvée time any more than We own our pre-tax income. After all, in
the state of nature (which Murphy and Nagel use as a baseline to judge our benefit from
government), we would not have 85 years of expected life; we’d maybe have 25 years, if
even that. So, we receive at least 60 years of expected life from government action.
Government and the taxes supporting it create our longevity and the distribution of life
expectancies. (Some of this creation comes about directly, through health provisions,
but most of it comes indirectly, through market forces operating against the background
of the rule of law.) Accordingly, according to the IDA, people have no entitlement to
their pre-corvée time. Most of (or at least a big chunk of) our lifetime results from social
convention or government action. So, we cannot be said to have a natural right to
choose how to spend our time. In the state of nature, we have no time to spend. We
cannot evaluate the justice of the corvée separately, as if the corvée were an intrusion
onto our time, but must instead evaluate the justice of the social system as a whole.
(Similar arguments could be made concerning other purported liberal rights.)
On its face, the IDA works equally well against liberalism as it does against
libertarianism. It undermines equally well A) the view that we have a special, nonconventional claim to our pre-corvée time and B) the view that we have a special, nonconventional claim to pre-tax income received from labor. Yet, despite this, we would
not accept that the IDA succeeds in defeating liberal objections to the corvée.
Accordingly, Murphy and Nagel must think the IDA does not show that we lack at least a
prima facie right over our time. Why is this? Why would the IDA work to block a
libertarian’s objection to income taxation but not a liberal’s objection to the corvée?
What’s the difference?

Murphy and Nagel anticipate something similar to this objection, and give the
following as an response: “Egalitarian liberals simply see no moral similarity between
the right to speak one’s mind, to practice one’s religion,…and the right to enter into a
labor contract…unencumbered by a tax bite” (Murphy and Nagel 2002, p. 65). Murphy
and Nagel say that some liberties are at “the core of the self” and must be protected
against the state; others are not at the core. They believe this holds even though by
their own logic they must admit that their favored kinds of liberties would have little
worth (or would not exist) outside of the state’s protection, and so the state makes
these rights possible.
As far as we can tell, this is why Murphy and Nagel would think the corvée
violates our rights in a way that income taxes do not. They would object to the corvée
because it violates what they consider our independently-determined rightful liberties,
but they would accept income taxes because they believe income taxes do not violate
our independently-determined rightful liberties. That is, the corvée violates something
like Rawls’s first principle of justice, while the income tax does not. Rawls’s first
principle—the liberty principle—guarantees every citizen an equal, fully adequate
scheme of basic liberties. Murphy and Nagel, like Rawls, but unlike natural rights
libertarians and so-called “everyday libertarians”, do not think that a right to contract,
to untaxed income, or to hold private property in the means of production are among
the liberties in this scheme.
Fair enough. But this suggests they believe the IDA is irrelevant to determining
whether a government action violates our rightful liberties or holdings. Rather, in the
debate between Murphy and Nagel and libertarians, the action is over which liberties
are basic and non-conventional. And this, Murphy and Nagel more or less admit, is not
decided by the IDA. Otherwise, they have no principled reason to reject the corvée.
Perhaps Murphy and Nagel are right, that is, perhaps for some reason not
offered in their book, economic liberty does not merit a high degree of protection while
civil liberty does. However, notice how this response just neuters their entire
book. Murphy and Nagel’s book doesn’t prove natural rights libertarianism is false; it
presupposes natural rights libertarianism is false and their view of liberalism is right.
Their argument against libertarianism or even “everyday libertarianism” doesn’t actually
appear in The Myth of Ownership.
In summary, they offered the IDA as an argument against libertarianism. The
libertarian can respond, Nozick-style, by asking, “Doesn’t the IDA undermine leftliberalism as well, not just libertarianism?” They respond by saying, “Oh, no, because
civil liberties, unlike economic liberties, are special, for reasons we haven’t articulated
here.”
The (Supposed) Trivial Incursion Problem
Some left-liberals claim to find the idea of self-ownership perplexing. For
instance, David Sobel argues that the idea of self-ownership is untenable because of
what we might call the trivial incursion-problem. As Sobel sees it, and summarizing very
quickly, we must back away from self-ownership because such rights would give people
absolute protection against unwanted incursions. However, such a right would prohibit

both severe and very minor (or trivial) incursions, and many ordinary human activities
lead to such incursions. Self-ownership is unacceptable, then, because it would mean
that people wouldn’t be able to drive a car for fear of having even a speckle of dust land
on someone’s person, say. Self-ownership paralyzes humanity.
According to Sobel, once we move away from self-ownership in this way, the
door is open to all other sorts of weakening of our rights over our persons as well. It
becomes an open question whether the state may forcibly take some of our blood and
give it to others who need it more badly. It becomes an open question whether the
state regulate what kind of sex we may have with consenting competent adults. It
becomes an open question whether the state may prohibit us from eating or drinking
certain substances in ways that infringe on no one else’s rights. And so on.
Sobel is perplexed about self-ownership, but we are perplexed about this
argument. Perhaps we think differently about property. In fact, upon reflection, we
believe that pretty much all liberals accept some version of a self-ownership thesis.
What they disagree about is what that self-ownership amounts to.
To explain why, let us sketch out a way of understanding self-ownership. Let’s
begin with thinking about ownership more generally. Property rights are bundles of
rights. The strength and nature of these rights can vary from owned item to owned
item. Even a relatively simple form of ownership such as the possession of a car can be
violated or negated in a variety of ways. Your car can be stolen or damaged, you can be
prevented from using it, you can be prohibited from selling it or giving it away, your car
can be wrongfully expropriated by the government, and so on. Each of these violates or
negates your property rights. But they affect your ownership in very different ways.
We can put this in more technical terms, using the Hohfeldian analysis of rights
(Hohfeld 1919). 1 When someone steals or damages your car, they thereby deny your
claim-right to exclude them from your possessions. When you are wrongfully prevented
from using your car, this denies your liberty to use what you own. When the law
prohibits a sale, it thereby denies your power to transfer your rightful possessions to
others. And when the government wrongfully expropriates you, it thereby violates your
immunity against having your rights unilaterally altered or extinguished.
Systems of private property standardly recognize all these elements of
ownership. However, this analysis masks a still greater complexity. Property rights
confer different kinds of liberties, claims, powers, and immunities on owners. We can
have rights to possess, use, or manage our property, rights to the income we can garner
using it, rights to the capital that the property represents, and so on (Honore 1961).
These rights will involve several kinds of Hohfeldian incidents. The right to possess, for
example, will typically involve both the claim-right to exclude and the immunity against
expropriation. A right to the income one can make using property will typically involve
the power to (temporarily) transfer the property to others, or the right to use the
property, in exchange for payment, as well as other rights protecting this power (such
as, again, the claim-right to exclude and the immunity against having these rights
annulled).
There is great variation among different legal regimes in how rights to property
are organized. The law can recognize, alter, or abridge various claim-rights, liberties,

powers, and immunities with respect to different parts and aspects of ownership. One
might thus have the liberty to grow crops on one’s land, but lack the liberty to build a
structure without a permit. An owner may have a claim that others not trespass on his
property, but also be subject to an easement which gives others the liberty to walk
across the property in designated places. One may have the power to transfer, but not
be immune from government expropriation through eminent domain. One can be a
partial or shared owner, as a shareholder in a firm. One can be a conditional owner, as
the holder of a mortgage-backed security. The list goes on.
Some philosophers have concluded from this complexity that there is no “core”
to property rights. Instead, it is said, property rights are like a bundle of sticks, with each
stick representing one of these many possible incidents. But the bundle can be put
together in many different ways, and none of the sticks is really essential. As long as the
bundle is recognizable as a property right, any one incident (or stick) may be present or
absent. (Grey 1980)
Others have challenged this thought. Some say that, while no particular incident
is essential, at least the presence of certain incidents requires the presence of others
(Attas 2006). Others maintain a stronger view and say that some incidents really are the
“core” of property. Perhaps, for example, the right to exclude is practically unavoidable
if property rights are to function as they should (Schmidtz 2011). As John Locke
famously writes in section 138 of The Second Treatise: “I have truly no Property in that,
which another can by right take from me, when he pleases, against my consent.” (Locke
1988 [1698])
It plausible that for a system of property to be acceptable or justified, it will have
to contain a number of regularly occurring features, including the claim-right to exclude.
But even at the conceptual level, it is true that any recognizable system of property will
have certain regularly occurring features. A society that generally abolishes or even
heavily curtails people’s rights to exclude others, to use their possessions, and their
powers to enter into economic exchange, has not just changed one form of property
into another. It will have effectively abolished it altogether. And, by extension, a theory
of the self that seriously undercuts people’s ability to control their own lives and bodies,
or gives others (including the government) a standing permission to use their lives and
bodies for their own purposes, will do violence to the idea of self-ownership.
None of this, however, means that self-ownership, like other forms of
ownership, must be absolute, or must be construed in such a way that any
encroachment counts as a violation. When Bas drives his car past Jason’s parked car,
and his tires fling a small rock against Jason’s tires, no system of property would
consider this a violation of Jason’s property right. Jason’s property right is consistent
with such a tiny incursion; it wasn’t meant to protect people against that. Or, more
mildly, if Bas sheds some skin cells on Jason’s car when walking by, no one would
consider that a trespass, and no one thinks that this thereby shows the concept of car
ownership is untenable or should be backed away from. Or, even more trivially, when
Bas walks by Jason’s car and slightly distorts its shape through gravity, one would
consider that a violation of Jason’s property right in his car, and no thinks this means
this concept of car ownership is untenable and must be back away from.

Jason’s property right in his car is meant to protect him against theft, vandalism,
and so on. The fact that tiny incursions are not protected by Jason’s rights make us
doubt that he genuinely owns his car. It doesn’t make us think again about whether Bas
can take it for a spin without asking first. It doesn’t make us think again about whether
Bas can crash his car into Jason’s. And it doesn’t make us think that the government
could simply confiscate Jason’s car and give it to someone else.
The kind of infractions to which Sobel refers are consistent with ownership in
general, then. But if that’s the case, then they are a fortiori consistent with selfownership in particular. Self-ownership rights were never meant to protect us from
speckles of dust that might fly up or from the gravitational distortion of passers-by.
They’re meant to protect us from coercion, violence, and the need to ask leave of the
socially or politically more privileged before we can live our own lives.
Sobel’s point about minor incursions not only fails to undercut the idea that
people really are self-owners, his arguments also suffer from the same problem that
plagued Murphy and Nagel’s Institutional Dependence Argument above. Suppose we
grant that having an ownership-like right over one’s body means (contrary to the facts)
that one is protected against trivial incursions in a way that paralyzes humanity. And
suppose that this is good enough reason to reject the idea that we have ownership-like
rights over our bodies. Perhaps, then, the state really can regulate our personal affairs,
as long as doing so doesn’t incur on other values too much. Perhaps the state really can
take our money and give it to others, even though we used our own bodies and time to
produce it.
Is there any principled or non-question begging reason to stop there? Nozick
asks why we should think that people aren’t allowed to opt out of the welfare state
while continuing to live within a country, but are allowed to opt out of the welfare state
by leaving. Or, similarly, why would it be acceptable for the state to forcibly take 40% of
the money we make using our bodies and time and give it to others, say, and not okay
for the state to force us to work 40% of our time for the sake of those who need to be
taken care of. These questions come running back in. If we are to follow Sobel and be
open to supporting the former, it seems we also ought to be open to supporting the
latter. And that, pace Sobel, remains simply unacceptable.
Note that it will not do here to resist Nozick’s challenge by saying that the state
doing the latter would interfere with our ability to live our own life, choose freely, or be
autonomous. For those are exactly the kind of reasons that support the self-ownership
thesis in the first place. If our choices are what matters, and it’s important to protect our
freedom to make them, then the state (or anyone else) doesn’t get to choose what’s
important and what’s not. The state (or anyone else) doesn’t get to choose that taking
your time is not okay, but taking the money to which you dedicated your time is.
Indeed, the Sobel-style argument threatens to obliterate rights, tout court.
Consider a treasured liberal right like freedom of speech. It’s true, of course, that our
free speech rights protect us from things that deny us the ability to speak our mind.
Does it protect us from trivial incursions on that ability? Suppose we say yes and point
out that this would paralyze people’s ability to speak. Surely the correct conclusion to
draw from this is not that there are no real free speech rights at all. The correct

conclusion is that our rights to free speech were never meant to protect us against this.
They are meant to protect one against censorship and the like. The trivial infringement
argument, then fails.
Self-Ownership: Almost Uncontroversial
We own different things in different ways. The bundle of rights that constitutes
ownership varies from thing owned to thing owned. The strength of these rights also
varies. We can own a cat and a car, but our ownership of the cat—which is real
ownership—doesn’t allow us to do as much with it as with our ownership of a car. The
way we own cats is different from how we own cars, which is different from how we
own a guitar, which is different from how we own a plot of land, and so on.
Morally-speaking, not just legally speaking, the kinds of rights we have over
these various things varies. But we really can own each of them. If you prefer to say that
ownership is “more extensive” when we have the full bundle of rights with no moral
constraints on use, that’s fine. But even if there is more or less extensive ownership, it’s
still ownership. Your cat is your cat. You are not allowed to torture it, neglect it, or have
sex with it, but that’s not because the cat is partially society’s or anyone else’s. Nor is it
because you don’t really own it.
Different kinds of moral arguments—such as Kantian deontological principles, or
claims about what it takes to realize certain moral powers, or arguments from a
privileged “original position”, or reflections on Strawsonian reactive attitudes, or
sophisticated Millian consequentialism, or whatnot—lead us to believe that people have
certain rights of exclusion and use over themselves, and possibly as well as some other
rights over themselves. And once you see how these rights shape up, you notice that
people’s rights over themselves amount to the bundle of rights—to exclude, to use, to
modify, etc.—that just so happens to look like what we call “property rights”. It is in this
sense, then, that we call people self-owners.
More precisely, we can think of self-ownership as being made up of two
variables. On the one hand, self-ownership offers protections (in the form of Hohfeldian
claim-rights) against unwanted incursions on one’s person. On the other hand, selfownership offers the freedom (in the form of Hohfeldian liberties) to use one’s person.
Since liberties logically entail the absence of duties (including duties correlating to claimrights), it follows that the two variables (internal to the idea of self-ownership) can be
traded off against each other.
The real question, then, is what mix of the two variables internal to the idea of
self-ownership (the claim to exclude and the freedom to use) is morally most desirable.
This should be obvious, of course. Bas is a self-owner with the freedom to use his
person, but this does not license him in punching Jason in the face. Self-ownership is not
best understood by completely maximizing on the freedom-variable, to the complete
denial of the exclusion-variable. And, again pace Sobel, self-ownership is also not best
understood by maximizing on the exclusion-variable, to the complete denial of the
freedom-variable. 2
Every liberal thinks we each have strong rights to freely use our persons, and
exclude others from them. Every liberal thinks that a woman has the right to say no to a

demand for sex, on the grounds that it’s her body. In this sense, then, all liberals accept
some version of a self-ownership thesis, though many of them would not describe their
beliefs as such. (On this point, note that G. A. Cohen thought the self-ownership thesis
was the essence of liberalism, not libertarian liberalism specifically (Cohen 2000, p.
252).)
However, in this kind of story, the concept of self-ownership can do almost no
work in resolving disputes among liberals. What liberals—both left-liberals and
libertarians—disagree about is how people own themselves, not that they own
themselves. Our disputes about how to best trade off the two variables internal to that
very idea. Criticizing someone’s preferred conception of self-ownership, in other words,
is like denying their conclusion. It’s a way of registering disagreement, but not an actual
argument against their view.
For instance, consider a variation of Peter Singer’s famous thought experiment
(Singer 1972). Imagine you see a toddler drowning in a puddle. Suppose you had bad
legs and can’t save the child. Suppose also there is a healthy bystander nearby who
could save the child, but who says, “I can’t be bothered. I don’t want my shoes to get
muddy.” Now, finally, suppose you have a weapon, and so can force the bystander to
save the toddler. May you do so? (Are you justified, or at least excused, in doing so? 3)
Perhaps you think the answer is yes. Does this somehow invalidate or make
trouble for the self-ownership thesis? Consider a somewhat related thought
experiment. Suppose a car is barreling towards your child, and the only way to rescue
him is to push him out of the way onto someone’s lawn. Or suppose your child is
injured, and the only way to get him to the hospital and prevent her death is to hotwire
a car. Or suppose you’re stuck in the woods when an unexpected, freak blizzard hits in
May, and the only way to survive is to break into someone’s cabin. May you do any of
these things? (Are you justified, or at least excused, in doing so?)
These are interesting questions, and virtually everyone agrees that the answer to
these questions should be some kind of yes. (They disagree on what precise form that
yes takes.) But we’ve never met anyone who, upon saying that because, in cases like
this, you may be excused or justified in temporarily overriding others’ property rights
(with the stipulation that you might owe them compensation in some cases), that
property is an inherently problematic concept and that private property doesn’t exist.
On the contrary, there are hundreds of years’ worth of common-law cases dealing with
such issues, which are meant to show just what property amounts to, not that property
doesn’t exist.
Again, something strange is going on with the critics of the self-ownership thesis.
In order to show the thesis is incoherent or problematic, they have to make the position
out to be something that no one would sensibly defend, and must use arguments that
no one would find compelling against other forms of property. The compliment they pay
to libertarians is that they straw man the position in order to critique it.
Conclusion
One myth is that what distinguishes libertarians from left-liberals is that
libertarians endorse self-ownership but liberals do not. That's false. At most, what

distinguishes them is how they understand self-ownership or what they think it implies.
Another myth is that Robert Nozick, or libertarians more generally, ground their views
on a problematic and question-begging conception of self-ownership. This isn’t true—
it’s based on a misreading of Nozick, one that fails to make sense of his book, and one
that goes against his own explicit outline of his book. On the contrary, it’s mostly the socalled “left-libertarians” who make heavy use of self-ownership as a foundational
premise. For run-of-the-mill libertarians, self-ownership is more of a conclusion than a
premise.
It’s an attractive conclusion at that. For once we understand what self-ownership
is—a bundle of rights—we see that denying it comes at a heavy cost. Anti-liberal,
authoritarian philosophies of course deny it, and that’s part of what makes their views
unappealing. Whether the best conception of self-ownership turns out to be compatible
with an extensive welfare and regulatory state is an interesting question, but to settle
that question, we probably won’t spend much time reflecting on the concept of selfownership as such. Nozick sure didn’t, and if he’d ever written a follow-up to Anarchy,
State, and Utopia, he might well have started by asking, “What’s all this fuss about?”
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1. If the state can tax 60% of your income (in effect, meaning that 60% of your
working hours go to the state), why can’t it instead require 5-10 years of
mandatory national service or a corvée?
2. If we shine a flashlight on your house at night for 2 seconds, that isn’t a wrongful
trespass. If we shine a floodlight on your bedroom window at midnight for an
hour, it is. At what point in between does the incursion become serious enough
to count as a rights violation? Why?
3. The dating “market” is full of misinformation, asymmetric information,
dishonesty, and misrepresentations, with often severe consequences. Should the
government heavily regulate dating?
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Hohfeld proposed an analytical understanding of rights as relations between parties.
On this analysis, one party’s liberty-right (sometimes called a privilege) to something
entails the absence of a claim-right in another to the same thing. A claim-right to
something, further, entails a duty for another party to that thing. (Consequently, a
party’s liberty-right to do something entails that the same party does not have a duty
not to do it.) Third, a power-right denotes a party’s ability to change a juridical or moral
relation in some party. When one party has a power, this entails a liability for another
party (a liability to have their juridical or moral position changed by the power-holder).
Finally, an immunity-right protects one against the use of a power. When one has an
immunity, some party has a disability (i.e. the absence of a power to change the
immunity-holder’s juridical or moral relation).
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For good discussion of this point, see Mack (2015)
The difference between justification and excuse is as follows: When a person is
justified in doing X, the action is right. When a person is excused, the action is wrong,
but her blameworthiness is reduced as a result of duress. So, for instance, killing a
murderous intruder in self-defense is a justified, while killing another person because a
gunman coerced you into doing it on pain of your own death may be excusable.

2
3

